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ABSTRACT
Inspired by the emerging literature on unintended consequences of EU external
action, this article studies how the anticipation of negative unintended
consequences factors into EU policy-making. Using policy learning analytical
lens, case study research strategy and process-tracing method, this article
examines EU policy-making on conflict minerals: when respective EU policy
was drafted, the negative unintended consequences of the earlier US conflict
minerals legislation figured prominently in the debate. The analysis shows
why and how major differences between US and EU conflict minerals
legislation have resulted from bounded lessons-drawing driven by two
opposing transatlantic advocacy coalitions. Eventually, the EU designed its
conflict minerals policy so as to mitigate perceived negative unintended
consequences of the earlier US law. The article contributes to literatures on
unintended consequences of EU external action, policy learning and
specifically bounded lessons-drawing in EU context, and conflict minerals
legislation.
KEYWORDS Advocacy coalitions; conflict minerals; EU external action; policy learning; unintended
consequences
Introduction
There is abundant evidence that European Union’s (EU) external policies gen-
erate a host of unintended consequences, and recent studies have scrutinized
these (Burlyuk [2017]; Burlyuk and Noutcheva [2019b]; Krasnodębska [2018]).
This article takes a different approach: instead of focusing on unintended con-
sequences of EU policies that have occurred, it focuses on how the EU aims to
anticipate – and mitigate, if deemed necessary, – unintended consequences in
its future policy. Using case study approach and process-tracing method, this
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article examines EU policy-making on conflict minerals: when respective EU
policy was drafted, the perceived negative unintended consequences of the
United States’ (US) conflict minerals legislation from 2010 figured prominently
in the debate. As a result, US and EU conflict minerals legislation differ on four
main parameters: geographic scope, range of applicability to companies,
approach (compliance- or risk-based) and enforceability.
This article asks: why and how did the EU learn from the unintended con-
sequences of US conflict minerals legislation? The analysis draws on policy
learning literature and specifically the advocacy coalitions lens (Sabatier
[1988, 1998]). The findings reveal an interesting story. Two advocacy coalitions
emerged in the US: advocating for and against state regulation of conflict min-
erals. The two coalitions eventually made their way to the EU policy-making
debate (launched in 2011), influencing various EU institutions differently. Con-
sequently, the EU designed its policy so as to mitigate the perceived negative
unintended consequences of the earlier US law. It remains to be seen whether
the EU has succeeded in pre-empting the negative side-effects it has antici-
pated. By way of a disclaimer, this article examines the role of policy learning
in a policy outcome without suggesting that policy learning can or shall be
solely credited for this outcome.
Methodologically, the analysis in this article draws on in-case process
tracing. By systematically examining diagnostic evidence (selected and ana-
lysed in light of research questions posed by the investigator (Collier 2011)),
we attempt to shed light on the relationship between policy learning and
the differential legislative outcomes. The analysis is based on both document
research and personal observations, which were possible as one of the
authors was an ‘insider’ in the conflict minerals legislation process through
his professional involvement.1
This article contributes to three strands of scholarship. First, it contributes
to the emerging literature on unintended consequences of EU external action
and international action more broadly (Burlyuk and Noutcheva [2019b]; Koch
and Schulpen [2018]). Burlyuk and Noutcheva assert that most if not all unin-
tended consequences in this context are or at least can be anticipated (2019a).
By examining how learning about the unintended consequences of other
actors’ policies factors into one’s policy-making, this article demonstrates
that not only policies may cause unintended consequences, but also (con-
cerns about actual or perceived) unintended consequences may and do
steer future policies. Second, the article contributes to policy learning litera-
ture in several ways: by unpacking the role of (transatlantic) advocacy
coalitions in EU policy-making; by bringing the notion of unintended conse-
quences and the element of anticipation and proactive management of
these into the study of policy learning; and, finally, by tracing policy learning
in a recent and thus yet unstudied empirical case of EU conflict minerals legis-
lation. Third, this article contributes to the literature on conflict minerals
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legislation by comparing the legislation and policy-making debates of two
important actors: the EU and the US. This article is also of relevance for
public policy, because it looks at why and how the EU can learn from other
actors’ mistakes. Despite a wide acknowledgement of external action’s side-
effects, there is little insight into how to foster policy learning that would
factor these into decision-making process.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the concept of
policy learning and why and how it occurs, focusing on advocacy coalitions.
The US and the EU conflict minerals legislation are then compared in
Section 2, setting the background for explaining differences through a
policy learning lens. Section 3 traces and explains the emergence of two
major transatlantic advocacy coalitions on conflict minerals legislation, and
Section 4 reconstructs the policy-making process in the EU to analyse why
and how policy learning occurred. The role that ‘unintended consequences’
(actual or perceived) played in various stages of the process and in the
debates within and between relevant EU institutions is central to this analysis.
Section 5 recaptures the potential effects of this policy learning on the actual
regulation, followed by a brief conclusion.
Analytical starting points
Defining policy learning
An oft-used definition of policy learning states that it is a ‘deliberate
attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in the light of the con-
sequences of past policy and new information so as to better attain the
ultimate objects of governance’ (Hall 1988: 6). Some add that one can
only speak of policy learning when beliefs about cause and effect
change (Dobbin et al. 2007: 460). Such learning can occur among policy
makers and other stakeholders (Dodds 2013: 250). Accordingly, this article
maintains that policy learning is a deliberate process, is not confined to
policy makers, and deals with changes in assumed causal chains on how
policy works.
The distinction between the notions of policy transfer and policy learning is
pertinent for this article as not all mechanisms of policy transfer involve learn-
ing: policies can be transferred (and diffused) not only through social con-
struction and learning, but also through coercion and competition (Dobbin
et al. 2007). We argue that in the case of EU conflict minerals legislation,
policy learning was an important mechanism of policy transfer at work. The
US policy was not copy-pasted blindly by the EU. In line with Dodds (2013:
253), we find this process to have been highly complex. In this transfer, stake-
holders could draw lessons by observing the effects of the American policy,
and they could engage in Bayesian updating by adding new bits of evidence
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to the existing knowledge (Dobbin et al., 2007: 460). Yet, this ‘evidence’ was
socially constructed by advocacy coalitions, among others, as will be argued
below.
In their work on policy learning, Bennett and Howlett identify three types of
policy learning different with respect to who learns, what is learned, and to
what effect: government learning, lessons-drawing, and social learning
(1992: 289). When it comes to government learning, state officials learn
about process-related organizational ways to enhance the efficiency of exist-
ing policies and programmes, resulting in organizational change. In lessons-
drawing, coalitions (groups of institutions and people that collaborate on pol-
icies) learn how they need to adapt the scope and size of programmes to
enhance the effectiveness of the policy. Finally, social learning relates to
policy communities (groups of like-minded policy makers and influencers).
Here, paradigms shift and new norms emerge, leading to new types of pol-
icies. This research focuses on the latter two types of learning in the
context of EU policy-making, leaving government learning out of consider-
ation: EU conflict minerals policy will become operational in 2021, hence gov-
ernment learning cannot be detected yet.
Mediators of policy learning: advocacy coalitions
In our analysis, we assign a key role to advocacy coalitions and build on the
advocacy coalition framework. Our aim is two-fold: first, to establish if learning
takes place within advocacy coalitions, and, second, to establish to what
degree advocacy coalitions stimulate policy learning in the EU. Advocacy
coalitions comprise individuals who belong to different groups (e.g., civil ser-
vants, journalists, academics, politicians) but share underlying core principles.
The advocacy coalition framework assumes that actors can be aggregated
into a number of advocacy coalitions of actors from various governmental
and private organizations. These actors share a set of normative and causal
beliefs and engage in coordinated activity over time (Sabatier 1988: 139).
Policy learning within advocacy coalitions
Because advocacy coalitions learn as they strive to find better ways to achieve
their preordained objectives, learning mostly takes place, according to Saba-
tier (1998), within these like-minded advocacy coalitions (as opposed to advo-
cacy coalitions learning from each other). Sabatier considers that ‘social
learning’ (i.e., learning leading to paradigm shifts) rarely occurs, as people
cherish their core beliefs and deep norms and do not alter these because
of new academic or technical insights. Perceptual filtering is a fundamental
component contributing to the lack of learning within advocacy coalitions:
coalition members will resist information suggesting that their core beliefs
may be invalid and/or unattainable and usually will use formal policy analyses
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to buttress and elaborate those beliefs or attack their opponents’ views (Saba-
tier 1998: 104, 120).
In this article, we hypothesize that individuals and organizations within
advocacy coalitions will display different levels of learning. A reluctance to
learn is particularly strong in ideologically dominated parts of organizations
and advocacy coalitions, where acknowledging failure and learning from it
would entail fundamental rethinking of core and ideological values, which
is unlikely (Sabatier 1998: 150). However, for the outer layers of an advocacy
coalition, these constraints might be less pronounced. Sabatier argues that
there is a lot of lessons-drawing within advocacy coalitions, as there is
increased sophistication in challenging the validity of data used by
opponents, countering opponents’ causal arguments, mobilizing political
opposition to opponents’ proposals, and enlarging the coalition (1998: 149).
Policy learning from advocacy coalitions
Advocacy coalitions aim to stimulate other actors to ‘learn’ as this might
advance their objectives. In this study, EU institutions, notably the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, have
been targets or recipients of the ‘teaching’ by advocacy coalitions.
However, it cannot be assumed that these are mere neutral absorbers. As
Dobbin et al. state (2007: 252), ‘policy makers learn lessons that are supported
by their beliefs’. In addition, the degree to which they are influenced by the
lessons depends, for instance, on the success with which advocacy coalitions
engage in framing (Kurzer and Cooper 2012: 731). Kurzer and Cooper (2012:
724) show that lessons are more likely to be taken on board if an advocacy
coalition belongs to the dominant lobbying group. What can be deduced
from this, and what is not researched regularly, is that advocacy coalitions
can be very dynamic in terms of their composition. We expect that to boost
the effectiveness of their ‘teachings’, advocacy coalitions will integrate new
members. In the case at hand, both advocacy coalitions aimed to expand
their membership, especially with members from areas potentially affected
by the unintended consequences of the envisaged legislation.
To stimulate learning (and to prevent the ‘wrong’ lessons from being
learned), advocacy coalitions will aim to contribute to a shift in the
problem-solution logic, so that a policy is no longer seen to contribute to
solving the problem (Skogstad 2017). The aim is to terminate a policy
sequence, indicating policy change. In this study, we aim to detect similar
efforts to deconstruct causal chains. Policy-oriented learning, especially
across belief systems, is most likely when there is a forum prestigious
enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate and
dominated by professional norms (Sabatier 1998: 106). We hypothesize that
advocacy coalitions engage in these prestigious fora and aim to influence
the policy makers in those fora.
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This article explores the hypothesis that lessons-drawing takes place
within certain clear limits, or boundaries. Bounded lessons-drawing corre-
sponds to the ‘political’ learning as described by Radaelli (2009). Learning
is used to support a specific regulatory policy paradigm, and not necessarily
because of a desire to deliver optimal solutions. Analysing the usage of
regulatory impact assessments in Europe, Radaelli concludes that the
extent to which policy learning takes place is often exaggerated (2009:
1147). Because of an overreliance on qualitative interviewing, notions of
e.g., power politics are underestimated, as interviewees make reference
to learning to protect their organizations from critique. In line with Radaelli,
we recognize that this benevolent, non-political view of learning can be a
source of bias that needs to be overcome (which this study aims to achieve
by in-case process tracing).
Differences between the US and the EU conflict minerals
legislation
There are significant similarities between US and EU legislation on conflict
minerals, as both address the same human rights issues: forced labour,
forced resettlement, and various forms of violence. However, there are signifi-
cant differences between the two. This conforms to Dodds’ observation that
‘hybrid transplants’ are more likely than ‘pure transplants’ (2013: 265).
First, compared with the US approach, the EU regulation encompasses
conflict minerals from a more expansive geographic area. The US law
applies to a defined set of ‘covered countries’: the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and its nine neighbouring countries. In contrast, the EU regu-
lation has a potentially broader geographic scope, because it will apply to a
yet undefined set of ‘conflict-affected’ and ‘high-risk’ regions.
Second, the EU regulation will cover a narrower set of companies than the
US law. The US law applies to any domestic or foreign issuer listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and using any tin, tungsten, tantalite, and gold
(3TG) in a product the company manufactures or contracts to manufacture.
Conversely, the EU regulation is restricted to importers of 3TG into the EU,
as well as smelters and refiners that process 3TG from ‘conflict-affected’ and
‘high-risk’ areas. Unlike the US law, the EU regulation does not require down-
stream manufacturers and sellers to engage in mandatory due diligence.
Instead, these companies will be encouraged to report voluntarily the use
of 3TG in their products.
Third, the US opted for a compliance-based approach, while the EU opted
for a risk-based approach. Thus European companies are not asked to claim
that their products are ‘conflict free’, but need to show that they have a
due diligence system in place in line with the OECD due diligence guidance
on mineral trade from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. In the initial
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regulation, American companies were required to mention that their product
could be considered ‘conflict-free’.
Finally, unlike the US, the EU proposed exemptions for smaller importers,
making the regulation voluntary for small and medium enterprises, while it
remains mandatory for the larger importers. See a comparative overview in
Table 1.
The puzzle that this article addresses is the following: whether and to what
extent the differences between the US and the EU regulation resulted from
policy learning with respect to unintended consequences. To repeat our
earlier disclaimer: by putting policy learning forward as an important factor
in the policy outcome, we do not wish to suggest that it is the only or the
most important one.
Two opposing advocacy coalitions on conflict minerals
legislation
The emergence of two opposing advocacy coalitions
In the US in mid-2000s, two advocacy coalitions emerged: pro- and against-
regulation of conflict minerals (Koch and Kinsbergen 2018). The ‘against-regu-
lation coalition’ consisted mainly of business representatives, Republican
Party officials, and certain journalists. Their underlying belief was that
businesses are not responsible for the ills of the world: governments are.
This coalition used three arguments against potential conflict minerals law:
(1) global supply chains make it impossible to trace mineral sources; (2) the
idea that trade in conflict minerals is the root cause of conflict is disputable;
and (3) such a rule would be too costly and futile. Conversely, the ‘pro-regu-
lation coalition’ consisted mainly of NGOs, Democratic Party officials, and
certain celebrities (Reinecke and Ansari 2016). Their underlying belief was
that the negative excesses of capitalism can and need to be controlled by
the state. Accordingly, conflict minerals legislation would be key to reducing
Table 1. Differences between the US and EU conflict minerals legislation.
US conflict minerals law (2010)
EU conflict minerals regulation
(2017)
Geographic scope DRC and surrounding countries All conflict-affected and high-
risk areas across the globe
Applicability to
companies
Upstream and downstream companies Importers of 3TG into the EU
Approach Compliance-based approach (in original version
it was required to declare products ‘conflict-
free’)
Risk-based approach, in line with
OECD guidance
Enforceability Mandatory Mandatory for large importers,
voluntary for smaller
importers
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instability and violence against women in the DRC. Together with NGOs, they
lobbied to have a law on conflict minerals.
During the financial crisis of 2008–2010, the Obama administration sought
to develop extra regulation to reduce risks in the financial sector and drafted
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. As part of this wider regulation, Article 1502 with
respect to conflict minerals originating from the DRC was introduced after
intense lobbying by the pro-regulation coalition (Seay 2015). Article 1502
obliges stock-listed companies in the US to declare which due diligence
they exercised to prevent 3TG in their supply chain from contributing to
conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa. It is estimated that about 6000
stock-listed companies fall under this regulation.
Both coalitions had strong and deep beliefs about what the policy should
be, and as Sabatier predicted, new information on the effectiveness and unin-
tended consequences of the law would be soon subjected to different percep-
tual filters by the two groups, based on their pre-existing beliefs. The same
would become clear in the EU debate on the unintended consequences of
the Dodd-Frank Act. Because of the activist stance of both advocacy coalitions,
lessons-drawing on conflict minerals legislation and its unintended conse-
quences became political. ‘Substantiating’ learning, that is using the knowl-
edge to support a specific regulatory policy paradigm, dominated (Radaelli
2009: 1157).
The against-regulationists: the de facto embargo was unanticipated
and hurts the Congolese
Public discussion on the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank Act
seemingly have been launched in earnest by a 2011 op-ed in The New York
Times titled ‘How Congress Devastated Congo’, written by David Aronson
(2011). The narrative of an unintended de facto embargo became increasingly
dominant, as exemplified by publications in Foreign Policy (2015) and the
Washington Post (2014). Increasingly, lobbying organizations started to use
this narrative in their submissions to policy consultations. The submission
on conflict minerals by the IPC (Association Connecting Electronics Industries),
to the EU in 2015 is a clear example:
The unintended consequence of the Dodd-Frank legislation has been a de facto
embargo on the DRC region, causing extreme financial hardships to those
depending on the minerals trade for their livelihoods. EU conflict minerals legis-
lation could help mitigate these unintended consequences… . (IPC 2015)
In the terminology of unintended consequences scholarship, the against-
regulation coalition framed the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act as unanticipated
(that is, unforeseen by policy makers) and clearly undesirable (see Burlyuk
2017: 1012–1013).
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When the against-regulation coalition came to power in the US with the
election of President Trump, unintended consequences arguments were
used to suspend the application of the law. For instance, the acting chair of
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Michael Piwowar (2017) argued
that Article 1502 needed to be dropped urgently because of ‘the tide of unin-
tended consequences that is washing over the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and surrounding areas’.
The pro-regulationists: the de facto embargo was anticipated and is
over
The pro-regulation advocacy coalition did not deny the existence of a de
facto embargo, which Aronson signalled in 2011. On the contrary: they
argued that this targeted embargo was anticipated and perhaps even
necessary. To flush out the rebels, a temporary ban was needed and was
a deliberate choice of the DRC government. However, according to this
advocacy coalition, the negative unintended consequences were now
over (Koch 2017). The submission to the EU by the European Network
for Central Africa (EURAC), an NGO heavily involved in the responsible min-
erals trade, is a good illustration:
The detractors of the Dodd-Frank Act generally omit to mention that its adop-
tion in July 2010 was followed between September 2010 and March 2011 by
the suspension of artisanal mining activities decided by President Kabila. […]
Although it is true that the de facto embargo has had negative economic con-
sequences locally […], it has also led to decreased revenue for the armed groups
and an improved security situation for certain mining sites. (EURAC 2014)
The pro-regulation coalition framed unintended consequences of the
Dodd-Frank Act as anticipated, possibly undesirable in the short-term but
desirable in the long-term (‘the necessary evil’). Indeed, the de facto
boycott was over in 2017, with levels of export of the targeted minerals
higher than in 2011 (Schütte 2018). Our analytical framework suggests that
advocacy coalition members will resist information that does not support
their deep core (policy) beliefs, which apparently was the case here: infor-
mation on the decrease of unintended consequences was systematically
filtered out by the against-regulation coalition.
The transatlantic nature of the two advocacy coalitions
Since this article takes as a prime unit of analysis these two rival advocacy
coalitions, it is important to examine the composition of the advocacy
groups in the US and the EU. In line with Kurzer and Cooper (2012), we com-
pared the organizations that submitted comments to the European Commis-
sion when it was preparing its proposal to the organizations that submitted
comments to the revision of the Dodd-Frank Act (2017). We noted a substantial
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overlap: 34% of the organizations that made submissions as part of the pro-
regulation in the EU also submitted letters to the US authorities. Themost influ-
entialmembers of the pro-regulation coalition (judging by the number of times
they met senior level officials of the rotating presidency of the Council of the
EU) were Global Witness, Amnesty International and Action Aid. Of these
three organizations, two were very active around the Dodd-Frank Act, indicat-
ing that the advocacy coalitions were transatlantic in nature and could relate
the lessons from policy measures in one jurisdiction to another.
Unintended consequences of conflict minerals legislation: the
EU drawing policy lessons
The frame shifts that had occurred in the US were being transferred to Europe.
In October 2010, four months after the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
European Parliament called upon the EU to legislate along the lines of the
US ‘conflict minerals law’. Subsequently, in 2011, the European Commission
announced its intention to explore ways of improving due diligence through-
out supply chains. Our analysis suggests that this was a clear case of ‘social
learning’; new norms took over older norms, giving larger responsibility to
the private sector. Additionally, our analysis suggests that lessons-drawing
has been occurring in the transfer of the US policy to the EU, as changes
with respect to the size and scope of the policy were adopted. This article
now focuses more specifically on lessons-drawing with respect to unintended
consequences. Why was the US law modified when it was transposed to
Europe, and what role did the anticipation of unintended consequences
play in this?
Why did policy learning with respect to unintended consequences
occur?
Our analytical framework highlights the catalytic role of advocacy coalitions in
promoting policy learning. This section demonstrates that the pro-regulation
coalition in the EU (with the underlying belief that the rough edges of free
market capitalism ought to be reined in by regulation) understood and com-
municated the unintended consequences in a different way than the against-
regulation coalition (who held the underlying belief that business could not
be held responsible).
An illustrative example can be found in the public consultation on the
potential EU conflict minerals regulation. The European Commission orga-
nized a public consultation prior to the publication of the proposal of the
regulation. Over 250 companies, NGOs, and researchers completed the ques-
tionnaire. In the summary report the divergent views on unintended conse-
quences of the two advocacy coalitions came to the fore. The against-
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regulation coalition highlighted the prevalence of negative unintended con-
sequences: ‘as a result of the US Dodd-Frank Act, the minerals trade in the
Great Lakes region has gone underground, making it even more difficult to
improve living/labour standards in the region because of falling export
levels’ (European Commission 2013). One of the problems that had contribu-
ted to the unintended embargo was the compliance-based approach of the
Dodd-Frank Act (European Commission 2013: 14). Forty-nine respondents
used the term ‘trade embargo’ when describing the consequences of the
Dodd-Frank Act. The pro-regulation advocacy coalition was virtually silent
on potential unintended consequences in the public consultation.
After the public consultation, the European Commission conducted ex-
ante impact analysis performed by its own staff to stimulate lessons-
drawing. In this forward-looking impact analysis of the proposed measure
of the EU regulation, the authors noted:
The US Dodd-Frank Act has created an incentive to avoid sourcing from that
region, and in particular from DRC… The probable unintended result is that
DRC minerals continue to be exported, yet informally and at very low prices,
to countries from which sourcing is considered conflict free. (European Commis-
sion 2013: 29)
As part of this impact analysis, the Oeko Institute, an independent think tank,
was asked to perform an analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Institute argued
that ‘it is of high importance to use the lessons learnt from the first years after
the Dodd-Frank Act came into force’ (Manhart and Schleicher 2014: 6). It
stated that experiences of regulating conflict minerals show that it is very
difficult to achieve the desired ban of conflict minerals without accepting a
general embargo situation. The final report stated that the EU had a chance
to develop an approach that would effectively contribute to stabilizing the
DRC without running the risk of creating unintended and adverse side-
effects. It was proposed that, rather than investing in costly downstream
chain-of-custody systems across the supply chains (as the Dodd-Frank Act),
these resources would be better used to directly support responsible
mining within the DRC.
Our analytical framework stipulated that advocacy coalitions will absorb
and promote knowledge that helps them to achieve their deeply held
beliefs. With respect to conflict minerals, the two coalitions were pushing
for their own understanding of the unintended consequences and for EU
policy makers to learn from the US experience. Hence, EU institutions
sought ways to accommodate such lessons.
How did policy learning occur in the EU?
It took six years before the final conflict minerals regulation was adopted by
the EU in May 2017. As suggested in the analytical section, policy learning
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across belief systems is most likely when there is a forum prestigious enough
to force professionals from different coalitions to participate. The OECD-UN
group of experts-ICGRL (International Conference of the Great Lakes
Region) appears to have been such a forum. Between the start of the nego-
tiations in Brussels and the actual outcome, 10 of these forums were orga-
nized, with an ever increasing number of participants from European
business associations, local mining organizations, advocacy NGOs and auth-
orities from the Great Lakes region. About 750 participants attended, includ-
ing European parliamentarians and the relevant European Commission staff. A
similar emulation-facilitating role was played by the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative with respect to oil, gas and mining accounting rules
in the US to Europe (Keizen 2018). The secretariat of the OECD succeeded
in developing norms together with the opposing advocacy coalitions, result-
ing in the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible mineral trade from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas (OECD 2012). Political differences were
overcome by developing very specific annexes for specific minerals at the
technical level (OECD 2010). The OECD due diligence guidance for responsible
mineral trade was considered the new normal of what could be expected of
companies. While the guidance was not yet ready when the Dodd-Frank Act
was adopted, it was available when the EU was deliberating. Consequently,
the proposed European system mirrored closely the OECD guidance.
How did the OECD-UN group of experts-ICGLR forum become such a key
player? For one, it was accepted by both advocacy coalitions and the relevant
policy makers. The OECD achieved this by organizing a Multi-Stakeholder
Steering Group (MSG) in which upstream and downstream industries, civil
society and governments from producing and consuming countries were rep-
resented. This steering group was chaired by a government representative
(e.g., Canada in 2015) and the vice-chairs came from the opposing advocacy
coalitions (e.g., Amnesty International and the London Bullion Market Associ-
ation in 2015) (OECD 2015). This MSG organised monthly conference calls,
attended by dozens of participants simultaneously, to determine joint priori-
ties, share relevant new developments and plan conferences. The EU started
to fund the OECD for this work and chaired the MSG from 2016 onwards.
EU policy-making is consensual and therefore lengthy, as agreement is
needed between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and
the Council of Ministers. It is interesting to note how the three institutions
took up the unintended consequences discussions differently and to reveal
that there were clear internal divisions within those institutions, based on
their allegiance to different advocacy coalitions.
Lessons-drawing in the European Commission. After the European Commis-
sion organized public consultations and impact analysis, it proposed its regu-
lation. In the initial proposal, the influence of the against-regulation coalition
was rather strong. The proposal stipulated a voluntary self-certification system
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for a small part of the supply chain, ‘hoping to avoid the de facto embargo of
conflict minerals, which has been a significant unintended consequence of
the US conflict minerals rule’ (Squire Sanders 2014). After this proposal was
launched, the pro-regulation coalition cried foul and argued that making it
voluntary would not affect potential unintended consequences. Because
the proposed regulation had global geographic scope and included all
unstable areas where minerals were extracted or traded, such as Colombia
and Myanmar, there was no legitimate fear that there would be a risk of an
embargo, they argued. Global Witness (2015) argued that the unintended
consequences discussion was distorted by the European Commission to
come up with a weak regulation.
Lessons-drawing in the European Parliament. The next step in the policy-
making process was the discussion in the European Parliament. Both advo-
cacy coalitions were present in the Parliament, with the progressive parties
mostly in the pro-regulation camp and the conservative parties in the
against-regulation camp. Interestingly, the various committees of the Parlia-
ment had divergent views on it. Whereas the Trade committee (the respon-
sible committee) would largely go ahead with the Commission’s proposal,
the Development committee (with less say on this topic) was closer to the
pro-regulation camp. One of the parliamentarians, Judith Sargentini of the
Greens, was a member of the pro-regulation coalition, having previously
worked for one of the lobbying NGOs. She was keenly aware of this difference
in approach between the two committees and lobbied for the development
committee to become the lead committee on this file. When this failed, she
succeeded in becoming a temporary member of the Trade committee, and
became one of the negotiators on this file in the trialogue (Koch, personal
communication). Somewhat surprisingly, however, on 20 May 2015, the Parlia-
ment voted in favour of far-reaching amendments to the Commission propo-
sal, demanding mandatory due diligence requirements for both importers of
raw materials and products containing those minerals. How did that happen?
There was large mobilization in Europe and beyond to influence EU parlia-
mentarians, who are more willing to ‘learn’ when the frame of NGOs is strong
(Kurzer and Cooper 2012). The frame of the pro-regulation coalition was stron-
ger, with images of blood coming out of mobile phones. As explained in the
analytical framework, advocacy coalitions are dynamic entities and are active
in integrating new members to their coalitions. The pro-regulation coalition
was growing, with a joint letter to the European Parliament signed by 157
NGOs (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2016). Members of the
potentially affected communities were especially active and sought to join
the advocacy coalition. For instance, Nobel-laureate and winner of the EU’s
Sakharov Prize, Congolese gynaecologist Dr Denis Mukwege started writing
letters to the Parliament for a tougher regulation (Mukwege et al. 2015).
Also, and crucial for swaying the German position, more than 100 Catholic
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bishops made clear that they were in favour of a stronger regulation (CIDSE
2015). It is hence important to see how the relative weight of coalitions can
change over time, as some coalitions are successful in mobilizing new
actors, affecting the lessons learnt.
One of the reasons that the Parliament proposed a stricter approach than
the Commission was the result of an unexpected position of a part of the
ALDE group, which is a liberal group and would normally belong to the
against-regulation coalition. However, one senior politician of this group,
the Belgian Louis Michel, belonged to the pro-regulation coalition for this
specific regulation. He had long ties with the DRC, having been involved
deeply in the peace negotiations in the DRC and having served as a
Foreign Minister of Belgium. He felt that the benefits for the DRC outweighed
the costs for Europe and was personally responsible for swaying the vote
(Teffer 2015).
The main argument of the pro-regulationists in the Parliament was that a
voluntary system would be ineffective. In their view, most companies do
not check their suppliers and fail to publish information on their due diligence
practices, unless they are legally obliged to do so (Cuvelier 2017). While pro-
gressive groups were satisfied with the vote, for their part, members of the
Parliament belonging to the against-regulation coalition were dissatisfied
with the results. Daniel Caspary, from the conservatives, argued that unrealis-
tic legislation would worsen any development prospects for people in the
region because of a de facto export ban (EPP 2015). In the analytical
section, we showed how the reshaping of causal chains is a key ingredient
of policy learning: Caspary tried to discredit the assumed causal chain
being championed by the pro-regulation campaign (even after being
defeated in the Parliament).
Lessons-drawing in the Council of Ministers and during the trialogue discus-
sion. After the vote in the Parliament, it was the Council of Ministers’ turn to
make its position known. The position of the ministers is negotiated at the
technical level by the ‘Working Party on Trade Questions’, a group of
(senior-level) civil servants from EU member states who come to Brussels
every other week. There were clear divisions between member states:
countries such as Sweden openly favoured a more ambitious regulation, as
proposed by the Parliament, whereas other countries, such as Austria,
France and Italy, opposed it. After months of discussions in the fall of 2015,
the Council of Ministers reached an ambiguous compromise in December
2015, allowing the trialogue to start. Since a majority of the ministers were
initially in favour of the original Commission proposal, and considering the
divergent proposal of the Parliament, a compromise had to be reached. Nego-
tiators from all sides regularly used the competing narratives on unintended
consequences. Also in the trialogue, the unintended consequences were at
the centre of the discussion.
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In February 2016, Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Trade, told the
press after one of the key debates that the main remaining problem was the
choice between a voluntary or a compulsory system (Barbiere 2016). At this
point the Dutch government, holding EU Presidency, started working on a
compromise that involved thresholds (a system they used for domestic regu-
lation in the coal sector): the volume of imports would determine if the legis-
lation would be mandatory or voluntary. These thresholds would effectively
exempt small and medium enterprises, which would suffer most from the
administrative burden (Global Witness 2016). This compromise made it into
the final document, so the Dutch presidency could announce that ‘after
years of talks’ Europe had agreed to the Dutch proposal (Government of
the Netherlands 2016).
Policy learning and advocacy coalitions: learning within and
from them
Policy learning within advocacy coalitions
In the analytical section, we hypothesized that there would be bounded learn-
ing within advocacy coalitions. We suggested that there might be a difference
in the degree to which members of advocacy coalitions are engaged in ‘Baye-
sian updating’, in which new bits of evidence can be added to the existing
knowledge. The idea was that the core of an advocacy coalition, i.e.
members with both pre-existing strong beliefs and material interests in
viewing a causal chain in a particular way, would be less likely to learn than
those who were more on the fringes of the advocacy coalition, i.e. organiz-
ations that have neither strong pre-existing beliefs nor material gains. To
observe learning over a prolonged time period, we tracked public statements
of a selection of members of the advocacy coalitions between 2009 and 2017.
It became apparent that some actors updated their narratives based on new
evidence on the ground, while others did not.
A change was found in the narrative of the leader of the NGO in South Kivu,
Eric Kajemba (Coordinator, Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix, Bukavu). He
was active in the field of conflict minerals and belonged to the fringes of
the against-regulation coalition. In 2014, he signed an ‘open letter’ which sti-
pulated that the Dodd-Frank Act had unintended and damaging conse-
quences. In 2017, he signed the letter of the civil society of Sud-Kivu to the
SEC stating that suspending Article 1502 would undoubtedly lead to
conflict minerals infiltrating the supply chain with devastating effects. While
there were unintended effects, they had been overcome.
Researchers Mitchell and Garrett also changed their narrative of unintended
effects. In 2009, they stipulated that there was a clear risk of unintended
effects: ‘A ban on exports, whether intended or unintended, or a disruption
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of the present economies of Eastern DRC risks creating additional violence
rather than reducing it’ (Mitchell and Garett 2009). They also belonged to
the fringes of the against-regulation coalition, having no material gain in
either position. However, these contributors’ language in their 2017 sub-
mission to the SEC had evolved from scepticism about the potential impact
of Article 1502 on conflict dynamics in the region to a conviction that the
Act resulted in increased transparency in mineral supply chains and thus pro-
vided much needed insight into the structures enabling extreme poverty,
child- and forced labour and human rights abuse (Mitchell and Garrett 2017).
However, there are also those parties whose vision has not altered. For
instance, the IPC, which belonged to the core of the against-regulation
coalition, had a similar narrative in their contributions on the negative unin-
tended effects for the local population in 2011 and 2017 (IPC [2011, 2017]).
In their 2017 contributions, they cited articles by Parker and others (Parker
and Vadheim [2017]; Parker et al. [2017]), which used outdated data, to
claim that the unintended effects were still ongoing.
Policy learning from advocacy coalitions
Policy learning is a politicized process. The lessons from advocacy coalitions
with stronger frames (‘blood minerals’) are more easily integrated than
those with less attractive frames (‘let’s reduce administrative burden’).
Lessons-drawing depended on pre-existing beliefs and values (as the case
of Louis Michel illustrated) and on the relative force of the advocacy coalitions.
So there are clear boundaries to learning; but it becomes apparent when ana-
lysing the final regulation that policy learning is nevertheless taking place.
Both the pro- and the against-regulation advocacy coalitions wanted the EU
to draw lessons with respect to unintended consequences of the US law.
The pro-regulation camp proposed as the main takeaway that the EU regu-
lation have a global scope because of the unintended consequences of stig-
matizing one region. The against-regulation camp argued that the regulation
ought to be voluntary because of the unintended consequences in producing
countries and because of the administrative burden for companies. Concerns
for unintended consequences filtered into the regulation, which is clear from
three of its elements: geographic scope, timing, and focus. Avoiding stigma-
tization, and hence a de facto boycott, appears to have been taken to
heart. Of course, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, but the EU regu-
lation is seemingly designed so as to avoid or at least minimize the negative
unintended consequences.
Target group: avoiding blacklist
There was a strong demand from industry for an exhaustive list of conflict-
affected and high-risk countries that companies could use to screen their
16 D.-J. KOCH AND O. BURLYUK
suppliers (IPC 2015). However, the Commission refused to provide such a fixed
list, wary of stigmatizing those countries and aiming to prevent a de facto
boycott of specific areas. Instead, the Commission wrote a draft handbook
‘To assist operators carrying out supply chain due diligence with the identifi-
cation of conflict-affected and high-risk areas’ (European Commission 2016),
providing links to websites where companies could find more information.
Eventually, the Commission conceded and committed to task a group of
external experts to provide a list of conflict-affected and high-risk areas,
which it would regularly update. The list will be indicative (it will give an indi-
cation of countries that currently are or could be affected by conflict) and non-
exhaustive (it will not necessarily include every area in the world affected by
conflict); however, companies will still have to comply with the regulation
when operating in conflict-affected areas that are not listed (European Com-
mission n.d.). This dynamic geographic scope will substantially reduce the
likelihood that one country will be targeted with an embargo, and hence it
can be considered as a viable mode of managing potential negative unin-
tended consequences.
Timing: smart time management
Also with respect to timing, the EU seems to have reduced the potential for
negative unintended consequences. After six years of discussion, EU regu-
lation was approved in 2017 but will enter into force only in 2021. This pro-
vides ample time for exporting countries, importing countries and
companies to strengthen their policies and prepare for implementation.
There is no need for companies to disengage from suppliers, but they can
work together to make their systems compliant with EU regulation. The situ-
ation in the US was different: because the law was adopted rather abruptly in
July 2010, there was continuous litigation about it, creating a lot of uncertainty
(Manhart and Schleicher 2014). Also, the source countries were in shock when
the US law was adopted, because they had inadequate time to prepare. As
noted earlier, not all changes should automatically be ascribed to lessons-
drawing. For example, the ‘smart’ time management could also have resulted
from European firms and countries that would appreciate time to prepare for
the new legislation and spread the associated costs over more years.
Focus: inclusion, not exclusion
The more inclusive focus of the EU regulation helps to reduce the potential for
the observed negative unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank Act. In a
Joint Communication on the proposed conflict minerals regulation, the EU
High Representative and the European Commission stressed the positive
roles that minerals could play in countries’ development. The communication
was clear in that it did not want to lead to disengagement from bona fide
mining in challenging environments:
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Through due diligence, companies can ensure that they respect human rights
and do not contribute to conflict… However, due diligence must be encour-
aged in a way that does not deter legitimate mining activity and related trade
in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. (European Commission & High Represen-
tative 2014)
Companies are thus not forced to label their products ‘conflict-free’. Following
the publication of the Joint Communication, EU High Representative Federica
Mogherini and the relevant EU Commissioners announced their decision to
allocate 20 million Euros towards the accompanying measures for the
2016–2020 period to promote responsibly sourced minerals from conflict-
affected and high-risk areas (Council of the European Union 2015).
Conclusion: bounded policy learning
One of the misconceptions about unintended consequences is that they are
automatically considered unforeseen, unanticipated. Yet, consequences that
are not intended by the actor might very well be anticipated. However,
because those consequences are deemed of lesser impact or low probability
(or both), the social action is executed regardless, or in such a way as to mini-
mize unintended negative consequences. de Zwart (2015) argues that these
unintended consequences are not a consequence of what Merton (1936)
calls ‘ignorance, error or ideological blindness’, but a result of protracted delib-
erations on intervention dilemmas. This article’s analysis of the process to
come to an EU regulation on conflict minerals revealed these protracted delib-
erations. Process-tracing revealed a clear case of lessons-drawing. The EU
adapted geographic scope, timing and focus of the initial proposal partially
following a debate that featured knowledge about the unintended conse-
quences of earlier US legislation on the subject. This does not mean that EU
regulation will not have unintended consequences: unintended conse-
quences are impossible to avoid. Rather, this is to suggest that EU regulation
might have fewer and different unintended consequences than its American
predecessor.
This learning did not happen automatically: advocacy coalitions were key
mediators in the process. Learning took place within advocacy coalitions;
specifically, organizations at the fringes of advocacy coalitions were updating
their views based on new information. This learning was bounded, however,
as there were clear limits to what was learned and by whom. The advocacy
coalitions were not substantially learning from each other, but when they
did, a neutral platform, such as the OECD, played an important facilitating
role. The advocacy coalitions stimulated EU institutions to learn lessons on
the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank Act. But also for EU insti-
tutions, the degree of this learning depended on the frames and the strength
of the advocacy coalitions and was not a neutral, technical process. Advocacy
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coalitions with growing and increasingly vocal memberships were more likely
to see their proposed lessons learned.
It remains to be seen if the negative unintended consequences of EU
conflict minerals legislation are minimized when the regulation enters into
force in 2021. Yet, to end on a positive note, our research suggests that EU
institutions are willing and capable of making effort to anticipate and mitigate
unintended consequences.
Note
1. In the period 2011–2013, when the US legislation was being prepared and rolled
out, Dirk-Jan Koch was living in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
which was a target of the Dodd-Frank Act. From 2014 until March 2018, he
was working as a ranking official for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
in that capacity was closely involved in the negotiation process that led to EU
conflict minerals legislation. Moreover, he served on the Multi-Stakeholder
Steering Group for Responsible Minerals of the OECD and participated in all rel-
evant OECD fora between 2014 and 2018.
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